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This paper studies  the  extent  to  which  offers  and  demands  in ultimatum  games  are  con-
sistent  with  equity  theory  when  there  is a joint  endowment  to  be  distributed.  Using  a
within-subject  design,  we  also  investigate  the importance  of the  bargaining  power  by com-
paring  the subjects’  behavior  in  the  ultimatum  and the  no-veto-cost  game,  which  differ  in
the possible  cost  of responders  rejecting  the  proposers’  offer.  Our  ﬁndings  suggest  that  pro-
posers  are  willing  to reward  responders  for  their  contribution  to  the  joint  endowment  in
any of the  two games.  As  for responders,  their behavior  is  consistent  with  equity  theory
only  in  the  no-veto-cost  game  (in  which  a rejection  is  costless  for  them)  when  the  game  is
ﬁrst played.  When  the no-veto-cost  game  is  played  after  the  ultimatum  game,  we observe
that the  responders’  demands  usually  exceed  their  contribution  to  the  endowment.  Finally,
this paper  reports  evidence  that  the ultimatum  and the  no-veto-cost  game  differ  in  terms
of efﬁciency  and rejection  rates.
© 2016  The  Author(s).  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the
CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
A team’s members all contribute to the production of a joint endowment. Because there might be some external factors
inﬂuencing the size of the endowment, complete contracts that specify how to distribute the total production are not always
feasible ex-ante, and negotiation needs to take place ex-post (Hackett, 1993). In this setting, two  elements likely to affect
the bargaining outcome are (i) the extent to which subjects care about equity (i.e., their willingness to incur efﬁciency losses
to implement an agreement that reﬂects their contribution to the joint endowment) and (ii) differences in the bargaining
power of subjects (i.e., whether or not their payoffs will be contingent on the bargaining outcome). This paper is an attempt
to study how these two elements affect bargaining behavior by using a laboratory experiment.
 This paper was  completed while I was visiting The Choice Lab (Bergen) in May  2015. I thank Bertil Tuggoden, Alexandre W.  Cappelen, Erik K. Sorensen,
Kjetil  Bjorvatn, Mathias Ekström, and Lars Ivar Oppedal Berge their very nice hospitality. Luis Moreno-Garrido contributed greatly to the experimental
design. I am also indebted to Astri Drange Hole, Hubert J. Kiss, Gueorgui Kolev, Juande Moreno-Ternero and Werner Guth for their useful comments and
their  stimulating discussion. Ana Conte was very kind in discussing with me the different econometric approaches to estimate the social preferences. Vita
Zhukova provided excellent research assistance during some of the experimental sessions run in Alicante. Finally, this paper has beneﬁted from suggestions
provided by seminar participants at The Choice Lab in Bergen and Middlesex University London. Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education
and  Science (ECO2014-58297-R) is gratefully acknowledged.
E-mail address: Ismael1@mdx.ac.uk
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2016.07.007
0167-2681/© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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In our design, the bargaining phase is preceded by the production of a joint endowment. The value of the endowment
epends not only on the subjects’ performance in a real effort task, but also on external factors beyond the subjects’ control
Konow, 2003; Frohlich et al., 2004; Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010; Almas et al., 2010; Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido,
012). Our aim is to test if equity considerations are relevant so far as subjects’ decisions in the bargaining phase are affected
y their performance in the production phase. We  assess the importance of bargaining power by considering the ultimatum
Güth et al., 1982) and the no-veto-cost game (Fellner and Güth, 2003), which differ in the cost for responders to reject the
roposers’ offer. More speciﬁcally, whereas disagreement results in no payoffs for either the proposer or the responder in the
ltimatum game, the proposer is the only one affected in the no-veto-cost game when her offer is rejected by the responder.1
If subjects care about equity and do not obtain their contribution to the joint endowment, this may  result in disagreement
nd generate efﬁciency losses, as a result. The discrepancy between what one contributes and what is obtained in return is
ndeed a major reason for conﬂict, as has been demonstrated by many revolts, strikes or legal disputes, etc. Arguments of
quity were put forward by players during the 2011 NBA lockout that delayed the start of the season with important economic
onsequences (Coates and Humphreys, 2001). More recently, supporters of the separatist movement in Catalonia (Spain)
ecided to defy the Spanish Government and initiate the process of independence by declaring that “Catalonia contributes
uch more to the Spanish treasury than most regions, but get disproportionately less in return”.2 As for the importance of
argaining power, one instance in which this seems to affect the subjects’ willingness to implement an agreement reﬂecting
heir contributions would be the distribution of TV rights in La Liga. Here, clubs negotiate their own  TV contracts and the
big two’ football clubs (Real Madrid and Barcelona) take together about half the money.3
Although the importance of equity and bargaining power should be clear from previous discussion, there currently exists
o systematic investigation of how both elements affect behavior in bargaining games when there is a joint endowment to
e distributed. Our paper pertains to recent research on fairness that studies behavior using games with production. Using
vidence from dictator games, Konow (1996), Frohlich et al. (2004), Cappelen et al. (2007, 2010), Almas et al. (2010) or
odriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012), among others, identify a non-negligible fraction of dictators that rely on equity
heory in distributional problems. This is in line with recent experimental evidence using impartial observers (Fischbacher
t al., 2012; Luhan et al., 2014), and recent ﬁndings in ultimatum games that highlight the importance of the equity principle
hen the endowment to be divided is not a windfall but produced by participants (Gächter and Riedl, 2005, 2006; Königstein,
000; Gantner et al., 2001; Fischbacher et al., 2012; Bediou et al., 2012; Franco-Watkins et al., 2013; Feng et al., 2013).4 One
ommon feature in this literature is the existence of entitlements over the endowment to be distributed. In Gächter and
iedl (2005), Gächter and Riedl (2006) these entitlements are determined by performance in a quiz, while the size of the
ndowment depends on individual choices (rather than on subjects’ performance in a real effort task) in Königstein (2000)
nd Gantner et al. (2001). The closest paper to ours, then, is Fischbacher et al. (2012), where subjects have to answer one
uestion to determine the size of the joint endowment.5 Fischbacher et al. (2012) highlight the importance of equity in
argaining games using evidence from an ultimatum game and a dictator game in which a third party distributes the joint
roduction. We  complement their ﬁndings by looking at the importance of bargaining power when subjects may  receive
symmetric payments in case of disagreement.
Our within-subject design is suited to capture the interplay between equity concerns and the power to inﬂuence the
nal outcome when one of the players is giving or taking away more power in the bargaining process (see Bediou et al.,
012; Feng et al., 2013; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2013; Ubeda, 2014; Rustichini and Villeval, 2014, or Ridinger, 2015, for other
ithin-subject studies).6 While other studies investigate how outside options inﬂuence bargaining behavior (Ciampaglia
t al., 2014; Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2013; Anbarci and Feltovich, 2013; Ridinger, 2015), we  consider a setting in which the
oint endowment to be distributed depends on the subjects’ performance in a real-effort task, thereby using a framework in
hich equity theory can be tested directly. The study of the bargaining power in games with production relates our paper
1 This game is inspired by Suleiman (1996) where the endowment to be shared is decreased by ı ∈ [0, 1] after a rejection. The ı-ultimatum game has
een  useful to study all the intermediate situations between the ultimatum game (ı = 0) and the dictator game (ı = 1). The no-veto-cost game in Fellner
nd  Güth (2003) makes ı = 0 for the proposer and ı = 1 for the responder. In the impunity game (Bolton and Zwick, 1995), the proposer always keeps the
hare  she decided to keep for herself. Güth and Kocher (2014) summarize some recent ﬁndings in these variants of the ultimatum game.
2 See the article in The Guardian: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/sep/10/spain-catalonia-independent-referendum (Last accessed
arch 2016).
3 The matches of Real Madrid and Barcelona are really the ones sought after by TV companies in Spain. In the past, the clubs have threaten to run away
rom  La Liga and commence a competition with other European clubs if they do not have a ﬁnancial advantage in the share of TV rights. Thus, the two clubs
ave  drawn the attention to the fact their earnings would not be much affected if there were a disagreement.
4 Along similar lines, Garcia-Gallego et al. (2008) show that behavior in the ultimatum game is affected by whether or not responders perform a real-effort
ask  after accepting the offer (see also List and Cherry (2000) for the effects of entitlements in ultimatum bargaining). The work of Karagözogˆlu (2012) and
onow and Schwettmann (2016) summarize behavior when there is a joint endowment to be distributed. See Conte and Moffatt (2014) and Moffatt (2015)
or the economic modeling of social preferences and fairness ideals and Elster (1989), Miller et al. (2011) or Birkeland and Tungodden (2014) discuss how
he  existence of different fairness motivations can result in disagreement.
5 Importantly, subjects may  be informed about the correct answer to the question in their design. The opportunity of allowing subjects to study the
nswer of some questions is interpreted as the possibility of education in Eisenkopf et al. (2013).
6 The FIFA (International Federation of Association Football) has recently sanctioned some clubs with a transfer ban that disallows them to make any
ignings. This decision has modiﬁed the bargaining power of the sanctioned clubs, whose situation resembles the no-veto-cost game described above.
n  the presence of the transfer ban, disagreement with a football whose contract is about to expire would have different costs for the footballer and the
anctioned club: while the footballer can still sign a contract with another club, the sanctioned club will not be able to replace the footballer.
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to other studies that manipulate property rights and entitlements. Rode and Le Menestrel (2011), for example, show the
inﬂuence of the power structure in distributive decisions by considering a setting in which one of the subjects works to
produce the endowment to be distributed (see also Rufﬂe, 1998; Cherry et al., 2002; Oxoby and Spraggon, 2008; Leliveld
et al., 2008; Heinz et al., 2012). In their experiment, the decision power is studied by giving the role of dictator to the
subject that (did not) produces the endowment, respectively. They complete the puzzle by considering a treatment in which
subjects bargain over the endowment in a repeated Nash demand game. Along similar lines, Bolton and Karagözogˆlu (2015)
allow subjects to communicate and bargain over a joint endowment in the context of unstructured bargaining. The authors
investigate the importance of hard and soft leverage by giving one of the players the option of making an ultimatum offer
at any point in time (see Gächter and Riedl, 2005; Luhan et al., 2014 or Karagözogˆlu and Riedl, 2014 for other experimental
studies in unstructured bargaining, where subjects are allowed to exchange proposals during the bargaining phase).
Besides looking at whether (and how) equity considerations are relevant for choices in the ultimatum and the no-veto-
cost game, we also study how these games differ in terms of conﬂict; i.e., rejection rates and efﬁciency losses. In terms
of the ultimatum game, the equal split has been frequently considered to be the fair solution. Nonetheless, there exists
overwhelming evidence suggesting that offers of around 40 % of the endowment is rarely rejected (see, among others, Güth
et al., 1982; Oosterbeek et al., 2004 or Güth and Kocher 2014 for a discussion of the results). This, in turn, indicates that
proposers (most likely because of their ﬁrst-mover advantage) end up getting a larger share of the endowment. In our paper,
we look at the rejection rates in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game, and compare the rejection rates when proposers
(responders) decide to keep (demand) a share of the endowment that reﬂects their contribution. By the same token, we
report evidence showing how likely is for proposers and responders to get their contribution to the joint endowment in
these two games. Thus, our paper touches upon the issue of procedural fairness in a setting with joint production.7
In Section 2, we present our experimental design. We  detail our research questions in Section 3. Section 4 presents our
results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our ﬁndings.
2. Experimental design and procedures
The experiment was conducted in the Laboratory for Theoretical and Experimental Economics (LaTEx) at the Universidad
de Alicante using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We  recruited a total of 288 participants among students at the university, all
of them reporting no previous experience in experiments.
We ran a total of 12 sessions, each of them with of 24 subjects. We  had three different phases in each session. In Phase I,
subjects performed a real-effort task to accumulate earnings that were distributed during a subsequent phase. We  borrow
the task from Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido (2012), where subjects were asked to complete a questionnaire that
consisted of 20 multiple-choice questions with 4 incorrect and 1 correct answer to each question. The questionnaire was
common to all subjects (this was common information) and took 35 min.8
When subjects recorded their answers in the computer screen, they were randomly matched in pairs and assigned the
role of Player A (hereafter, the proposer, i = p) or Player B (hereafter, the responder, i = r).9 Both members received information
about the joint endowment to be distributed in Phase II. This includes information about the number of correct answers qi
∈ {0, 1, . . .,  19, 20}  and the reward level ai > 0 of each member i = {p, r}. Let a = (ap, ar) and q = (qp, qr) denote the vector of
reward levels and correct answers, respectively. The joint endowment to be distributed X(a, q) is then obtained as follows:
X(a, q) = xp(qp, ap) + xr(qr, ar) = qpap + qrar
Reward levels were beyond the subjects’ control and were announced after subjects completed the questionnaire. The
only information prior to completing the questionnaire was that each correct question would help to accumulate earning for
a subsequent stage, and that each question would be paid at a certain reward level ai ∈ [100, 200] that could possibly vary
across individuals.10 To introduce variability in the data, we ﬁxed ap = 150 and varied ar ∈ {100, 150, 200}. It was common
information that the reward levels and the roles would be assigned at random, independently on the subjects’ performance
in the questionnaire.11
Once subjects were told their contribution and their roles, they proceeded to Phase III where subjects were asked to make
decisions under two different scenarios. In the ultimatum game, the proposer had to make an offer to the responder, who
7 As described in Herings and Predtetchinski (2015), “procedures are deemed fair if they create equal chances for persons involved in the procedures”. Of
course, we do not claim that the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game will give subjects the same opportunities to get their contribution to the joint
endowment. However, we want to provide some empirical evidence along these lines. Hence we test whether equity-concerned subjects are equally likely
to  obtain their contribution to the joint endowment regardless of whether they are in the role of proposers or responders in these two games.
8 The English version of the detailed instructions used in the experiment is available in Appendix A. Our questionnaire (available upon request) was
intended to measure effort as questions were time-consuming but not hard to solve (see List and Cherry (2000), Gächter and Riedl (2005), Gächter and
Riedl  (2006) or Karagözogˆlu and Riedl (2014) for a similar task).
9 It was common information that roles were independent of performance. The role assignment (earned or randomly assigned) matters for the behavior
in  ultimatum bargaining as it is shown in Güth and Tietz (1990), Hoffman and Spitzer (1985), Hoffman et al. (1994) or Kimbrough and Sheremeta (2014).
10 All the reward levels referred to Pesetas, which were transformed into Euros to pay subjects at the end of the experiment (1 Euro ≈ 166 Pesetas).
11 Reward levels and roles were assigned at random as follows. In each session, 12 subjects were rewarded ai = 150 and assigned the role of proposers, 6
subjects were rewarded ai = 150 and assigned the role of responders, 6 subjects were rewarded ai = 200 and assigned the role of responders, and 6 subjects
were rewarded ai = 200 and assigned the role of responders. After being assigned the roles, proposers and responders were randomly matched in pairs.
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imultaneously chose her minimum acceptable offer (hereafter MAO).12 We  hereafter denote p the proposer’s offer and
r the responder’s MAO, where 0 ≤ p ≤ X(a, q), and 0 ≤ r ≤ X(a, q). Payoffs in the ultimatum game can then be obtained as
ollows:
If p ≥ r, then p(p, r) = X(a, q) − p and r(p, r) = p
If p < r, then p(p, r) = r(p, r) = 0
here i(p, r) denotes ﬁnal payoffs of subject i = {p, r}.
We gave the responder the threat power by considering the no-veto-cost game (Fellner and Güth, 2003). In this game,
isagreement results in no loss for the responder, who always receives the proposer’s offer regardless of whether or not it
xceeds the MAO. The proposer, however, only receives the share of the endowment that she decided to keep if her offer
atisﬁed the responder’s MAO. Payoffs in the no-veto-cost game can then be obtained as follows:
If p ≥ r, then p(p, r) = X(a, q) − p and r(p, r) = p
If p < r, then p(p, r) = 0 and r(p, r) = p
In our experiment, both the subjects’ role and the matching protocol were announced in Phase II and kept constant
uring Phase III; i.e., subjects made their decisions for the same pair in the two different games. The games were presented
equentially, therefore subjects received information about the second game to be played after making their choices in the
rst one. We  control for the order in which the games were played; i.e., subjects played either the ultimatum or the no-veto-
ost game ﬁrst in half of the sessions. In addition, the experiment relies on a no feedback design;  i.e., neither the offer of the
roposer nor the MAO  of the responder in the ﬁrst game were announced to subjects before they played the second one.
As for the ﬁnal payment, one of the two games was selected at random to pay subjects at the end of the session. Average
arnings were roughly 12 Euros, including a 3 Euros participation fee. Each session lasted about 1 h.
. Research questions
Research on distributional justice highlights that equity and equality are two fundamentally different concepts when the
ndowment to be shared is the result of individual contributions. Whereas equality considers that all subjects should receive
he same share of the joint endowment, equity theory proposes that subjects’ should receive a share of the endowment that
eﬂects their contribution.13 The accountability principle, as ﬁrst proposed by Konow (1996), combines both equity theory
which makes the ﬁnal allocation proportional to agents’ inputs), and attribution theory (which considers responsibility
r control over inputs). More precisely, the accountability principle considers that subjects should be rewarded according
o variables that they can inﬂuence (i.e., effort in the questionnaire) but not according to variables beyond their control
i.e., reward levels). Thus, the responder should receive a share qr = qr/(qp + qr) of the joint endowment X(a, q), where
q
r ∈ [0,  1] stands for the proportion of correct answers that correspond to her effort.14
In our experiment, subjects can assess their relative contribution to the pair because they receive information about each
ember’s contribution to the joint endowment.15 The ﬁrst question to be addressed concerns whether equity considerations
re relevant to our design. In particular, we want to examine whether or not proposers are willing to compensate responders
or their effort in the production of the joint endowment, as suggested by Königstein (2000), Gantner et al. (2001), Fischbacher
t al. (2012) or Franco-Watkins et al. (2013), among others. By the same token, we want to test if responders are willing to
ncur in efﬁciency losses by demanding a share of the joint endowment that reﬂects their contribution. The ﬁrst hypothesis
hat we want to reject is then as follows:
12 Given the within-subject design and the nature of the endowment, it is more convenient to ask recipients their MAO. Although our device imposes
onotonic rejection strategies, this should not be a problem as most responders exhibit these strategies (Güth and Kocher, 2014).
13 As discussed in Young (1994), the idea that ‘what is just is what is proportional’ goes back to Aristotle. For early contributions in equity theory see
omans (1961) or Selten (1978). The interested reader in the different fairness ideals can consult Konow (2003). For a summary of recent experimental
vidence see Karagözogˆlu (2012) or Konow and Schwettmann (2016).
14 The total endowment to be distributed in our experiment depends not only on the subjects’ performance, but also on the reward levels. Our design
hoice  resembles real life situations in which (non-contractable) random events might affect performance. As already noted in Konow (1996, 2000) or
appelen et al. (2007, 2010), the beauty of considering a procedure in which there are factors that subjects cannot inﬂuence relies on the existence of
eterogeneous views with regard to what constitutes a fair division. Thus, the libertarian principle requires that subjects be held responsible for factors
eyond their control and hence, responders receive their monetary contribution xr(qr , ar) to the joint endowment X(a, q). We deliberately focus on the
ccountability principle, which seems to be the equity principle that subjects employ the most (Konow, 1996; Cappelen et al., 2007; Fischbacher et al.,
012) and the one preferred by impartial spectators (Fischbacher et al., 2012; Luhan et al., 2014). All our ﬁndings, however, hold when we consider the
ibertarian principle, as we  shall discuss below. To see how people tradeoff different justice principles see Cappelen et al. (2007, 2010), Almas et al. (2010)
r Conte and Moffatt (2014). The work of Cappelen et al. (2013) discusses how people treat inequalities that result from luck.
15 The reader interested in bargaining behavior when subjects are uncertain about their contribution to the endowment can refer to Corgnet et al. (2011),
antner et al. (2013), Gantner and Kerschbamer (2013), or Karagözogˆlu and Riedl (2014). For experimental evidence in bankruptcy situations, where
ubjects have information about their claims but these exceed the available endowment, the interested reader can consult Herrero et al. (2010) or Cappelen
t  al. (2015).
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H10 : Subjects do not account for equity considerations. In particular, the responders’ contribution to the joint endow-
ment does not affect the proposer’s offer or the responder’s MAO.
One noteworthy aspect of our design is that responders have more power in the no-cost-veto game in that they always
receive the proposer’s offer regardless of whether or not this exceeds the MAO. Although responders can then ask for their
contribution to the endowment -or any other amount- at no risk in the no-veto-cost game Fellner and Güth (2003), note that
proposers (under the assumption that subjects only care about their own payoffs “should completely neglect the threat power”
and choose the lowest possible offer” (page 55). This is because responders would accept all offers in equilibrium, given that
their payoffs do not depend on whether or not the offer is accepted.16 This would also be the prediction if responders had
utilitarian preferences as suggested by Kritikos and Bolle (2001), Charness and Rabin (2002), Engelmann and Strobel (2004)
or Lopez-Perez et al. (2015). In that case, proposers will demand low amounts both in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost
game so as to guarantee that the joint endowment is distributed in both games. The second hypothesis that we want to
reject is then as follows:
H20 : Subjects do not account for the bargaining power. In particular, proposers and responders will behave in the same
manner in the ultimatum game and in the no-veto-cost game.
Although we lack experimental evidence showing how subjects behave in the no-veto-cost game when there is a joint
endowment to be distributed Fellner and Güth (2003), observe that proposers increase their offers, while responders tend
to ask for more in the no-veto-cost game. We  want to investigate whether or not these behavioral patterns will also be
observed in our game with production, where subjects may  exhibit preferences over equity.
Because our within-subject design considers both sequences, and subjects do not receive any feedback across games, we
expect for the order of play to have no effect on the subjects’ behavior. We  then expect not to reject the following hypothesis.
H30 : Proposers’ and responders’ behavior is not affected by the order in which the games are played; i.e., their behavior
in the ultimatum (no-veto-cost) game would be the same regardless of whether this game is played ﬁrst or second.
Besides assessing the impact of equity and the bargaining power on behavior, the current article attempts to study the extent
to which the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game differ in terms of conﬂict, efﬁciency and procedural fairness. Our last
hypothesis to be rejected is then as follows:
H40 : The ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game do not differ in terms of rejection rates, efﬁciency or procedural
fairness.
The ﬁrst two questions in H40 are relevant as the threat power may  trigger more rejections, but rejections are indeed “cheaper”
in that the responders’ payoffs are not affected; i.e., when there is disagreement in the ultimatum game both players get
nothing, while the responder always receives the proposer’s offer in the no-veto-cost game, even if the offer is rejected. As for
the issue of procedural fairness, we shall compare the likelihood of rejections when proposers (responders) decide to keep
(demand) their contribution to the endowment, both in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game. We  shall also look at the
frequency of proposers and responders that obtain at least their contribution to the joint endowment in these two games.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Subjects have, on average, 10.5 correct questions in the questionnaire (Min: 3, Max: 19, SD = 3.35). The amounts jointly
earned in Phase I vary between 1750 and 5750 Pesetas (i.e., the endowment to be distributed is between 10.5 and 34.6 Euros).
Next, we show the subjects’ average behavior. Because different pairs could make their choices over different endowments,
we hereafter focus on the proportion of the endowment that the proposer decided to offer to the responder (p/X(a, q)), and
the proportion of the endowment that the responder demanded for herself (r/X(a, q)). Fig. 1 displays the distribution of these
two variables. The behavior in the ultimatum (no-veto-cost) game is presented in the top (bottom) panel, respectively.17
Table 1 below the ﬁgure presents the descriptive statistics for both games.
16 Theoretically, a low (zero) offer and a low (zero) demand would be the unique Nash equilibrium in the ultimatum game when subjects are self-
interested and are merely concerned about their own material payoff. In the no-veto-cost game, any demand might be part of the Nash equilibria outcome
for  self-interested agents given that their own  payoff is never affected by their demand. To see this, consider (for simplicity) the case in which the proposer
can  only choose one of two  possible offers: p ∈ {Lp, Hp }, where Lp < Hp . We show that there is a Nash equilibrium in which the proposer offers Lp and the
responder chooses to accept any of the two  offers; i.e., r = Lp . This situation yields payoffs p(p, r ) = X(a, q) − Lp and r (p, r ) = Lp for the proposer
and  the responder, respectively. Note that the proposer cannot get a better payoff given the MAO set by the responder. Similarly, the responder cannot
beneﬁt  from deviating unilaterally as setting any other MAO  (e.g., r = Hp ) will not increase her payoff: i.e., r(p , r) = r(p) in the no-veto-cost game.
There  is multiplicity of Nash equilibria, though. For example, it is also possible to have one equilibrium in which the responder demands everything and
the  proposer honor this MAO by offering the entire endowment (this would be the Nash equilibrium preferred by responders).
17 The (within-subject) difference between the share of the endowment offered or demanded in the no-veto-cost game and the share of the endowment
offered or demanded in the ultimatum game is presented in the Appendix B1. This includes information about the share of proposers (responders) that
offered  (demanded) more in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game.
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Fig. 1. Distribution of choices in the ultimatum game (top panel) and the no-veto-cost game (bottom panel).
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Ultimatum game No-veto-cost game
Proposer Responder Proposer Responder
Mean 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.55
Standard deviation 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.18
Maximum 0.70 0.78 0.84 1
Minimum 0.08 0.04 0 0.22
Share  offering/demanding nothing 0 0 0.01 0
Share  offering/demanding contribution 0.18 0.09 0.16 0.08
Share  offering/demanding above contribution 0.24 0.32 0.35 0.51
Share  offering/demanding half 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.12
Share  offering/demanding more than half 0.30 0.25 0.40 0.52
Note: There are 288 subjects in our data: 144 proposers and 144 responders.
150 I. Rodriguez-Lara / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 130 (2016) 144–165Fig. 2. A bubble plot of choices in the ultimatum game (top panel) and the no-veto-cost game (middle panel).
Although we observe a tendency towards the egalitarian split, both in terms of offers and demands, there are three
behavioral patterns that are worth mentioning. First, a substantial share of proposers (responders) offered (demanded)
more than half of the joint endowment. Second, neither the proposers nor the responders tend to offer or demand zero,
what would be the outcome predicted by the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium under the assumption that subjects are
merely concerned about their own material payoffs and do not take into consideration fairness ideals.18 Third, the threat of
power seems to affect subjects’ behavior in a different manner. More speciﬁcally, responders (on average) seem to increase
their MAO  substantially in the no-veto-cost game whereas proposers do not seem to modify their offers as much; e.g., more
than half of responders demanded more than what they have contributed in the no-veto-cost game and some of them even
demanded the entire endowment (see Fig. 1).
These ﬁndings suggest that contributions to the joint endowment and the bargaining power of responders may be
important elements at stake. In what follows, we  investigate the subjects’ behavior in more detail. In Section 4.2, we test
H10 and H
2
0 by looking at the importance of equity in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game. This section includes the
analysis for the different order in which the games are played so as to investigate H30 . We  show in Section 4.3 the observed
rejection rates and compare the two games in terms of efﬁciency and rejection rates. This is to shed some light upon H40 .4.2. Behavior in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost games with joint production
The chief question we want to address with our ﬁrst hypothesis is whether equity considerations are relevant in the
bargaining phase. Fig. 2 displays the proposer and the responder’s behavior in the ultimatum game (top panel) and the
18 Recall that there is multiplicity of equilibria in the no-veto-cost game, and that utilitarian preferences predict for responders to demand low amounts
both  in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game.
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Table  2
Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcient between subject’s behavior (Offer/MAO) and the responder’s contribution to the endowment, disaggregated by the
order  in which the games are played.
Ultimatum game No-veto-cost game
Proposer Responder Proposer Responder
Correlation coefﬁcient (All data) 0.71*** −0.07 0.56*** 0.11
The  game is played ﬁrst 0.66*** −0.21* 0.55*** 0.37***
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ote: There are 288 subjects in our data: 144 proposers and 144 responders. Half of the data corresponds to the ultimatum (no-veto-cost) game being
layed  ﬁrst. Signiﬁcance at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
o-veto-cost game (bottom panel) as a function of the responder’s relative performance in the questionnaire (qr ). We depict
wo lines at 0.5 to indicate the egalitarian prediction (horizontal line) and the point at which proposers and responders
ffort have contributed the same number of correct answers (vertical line). The 45 degree line represents the prediction
f the accountability principle (i.e., the behavior that is consistent with equity theory).19 The Spearman’s rank correlation
oefﬁcient between the behavior in the games (Offer/MAO) and the responder’s relative performance is given in the table
elow the ﬁgure.20 This includes disaggregated data by the order in which the games are played.
Equity theory predicts a positive correlation between subjects’ choices and the responder’s contribution to the joint
ndowment. We  observe that the proposer’s behavior is consistent with the idea of equity in that the Spearman’s rank
orrelation is positive and signiﬁcant both in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game. This ﬁnding is robust when we  look
t the order in which the games are played in Table 2 (p-values < 0.001). The evidence for responders is not so clear-cut. Their
AO in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game seems to be uncorrelated with their performance in the questionnaire
hen we look at the pooled data (p-value > 0.18). There is, however, evidence for order effects in that responders with better
erformance tend to demand an smaller (larger) share of the joint endowment in the ultimatum (no-veto-cost) game, but
nly when this is played ﬁrst.
To account for multiple factors inﬂuencing behavior (e.g., differences in reward levels or the size of the endowment) we
erform an OLS analysis. The results for the proposer (responder) are summarized Table 3 (Table 4), respectively. In both
ases, the dependent variable is the share of the endowment that proposers (responders) decided to offer (demanded for
hemselves).21 The set of independent variables include the percentage of the correct questions by responders (qr ) and a
ummy  variable that takes the value of 1 for the no-veto-cost game (INVC). We  control for the size of the endowment (X(a, q))
nd differences in reward levels by deﬁning a dummy  that takes the value of 1 when the proposer is rewarded more than the
esponder per each correct answer (Iap>ar ), and a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when the proposer is rewarded
ess than the responder per each correct answer (Iap<ar ). A dummy  variable (IUG/NVC) controls for the order in which the
ames are played, taking the value 1 if the ultimatum game is played ﬁrst. Regressions (1)–(3) report our estimates for the
ooled data. We perform a between-subject comparison in regression (4). This only considers observations from the ﬁrst
ame to be played in each of the sessions. We  investigate the importance of the order of games in the subjects’ behavior
n regressions (5) and (6), which consider the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost separately. Regressions (7)–(10) present our
stimates for each possible order and each possible game separately. The reported standard errors are robust and clustered
t the individual level.
In Table 3, we observe that the estimate for the intercept is always positive and signiﬁcant, what indicates that proposers
re willing to compensate responders after attempting the questionnaire.22 The effect of the responder’s effort on the
roposer’s offer is also positive and signiﬁcant, even after controlling for the reward levels, the endowment size and the
rder in which the games are played (regressions 1–3). This is conﬁrmed by the between-subjects analysis (regression 4), or
hen we disaggregate the data by the order in which games are played (regressions 7–10). We  indeed ﬁnd no order effects
n the proposer’s behavior in the ultimatum or the no-veto-cost game (regressions 5 and 6). Thus, our ﬁndings conﬁrm
hat proposers behave according to equity theory in any of the games. As for the importance of the responder’s power of
hreat, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that proposers behave the same in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game
p-values > 0.44) (regressions 1–4).
esult 1. Proposers take into account equity considerations. They offer to responders a share of the joint endowment that
orresponds to their effort, that is, the number of correct questions in the questionnaire. The threat power of responders and the
rder in which the games are played do not seem to affect the proposers’ behavior.When we look at responders’ behavior in Table 4, we ﬁnd that the intercept is always positive and signiﬁcant. Hence,
esponders are willing to incur efﬁciency losses by demanding a positive share of the endowment. This, in turn, would suggest
hat efﬁciency motives are not driving the responder’s behavior, as their demand is signiﬁcantly different from zero both in
19 The results for the monetary contribution (i.e., the libertarian principle) follow a similar pattern and are available in Appendix B3.
20 All our ﬁndings are robust if we consider the Pearson or the Kendall- rank correlation coefﬁcients instead.
21 Our ﬁndings are robust to models of censored data.
22 See Rufﬂe (1998), Oxoby and Spraggon (2008), Heinz et al. (2012) or Rode and Le Menestrel (2011) for related evidence in the dictator game, and
arcia-Gallego et al. (2008) for evidence in the ultimatum game.
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Table 3
Econometric analysis: OLS regressions for the proposer’s decision (Offer).
Dependent variable: Share of the endowment offered by proposers
Between- UG UG NVC NVC
All  data All data All data Subject UG NVC First Second First Second
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept 0.145*** 0.177*** 0.169*** 0.219*** 0.107** 0.224** 0.157** 0.128** 0.214* 0.354***
(0.03)  (0.04) (0.0406) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.120)
Responders’ effort (qr ) 0.628*** 0.666*** 0.662*** 0.597*** 0.696*** 0.673*** 0.568*** 0.700*** 0.683*** 0.465***
(0.06)  (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.125) (0.08) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12)
No-veto-cost (INVC) 0.006 0.039 0.039 −0.048
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
Interaction (qr INVC) −0.064 −0.064 0.069
(0.09) (0.09) (0.16)
Reward levels (Iap>ar ) 0.018 0.018 0.027 0.007 0.028 0.005 0.008 0.0464 0.008
(0.02)  (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Reward  levels (Iar >ap ) −0.012 −0.012 −0.002 −0.024 −0.006 −0.029* −0.017 0.028 −0.041*
(0.02)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02)
Endowment size (X(a, q)) −1.68e−05 −1.68e−05 −1.83e−05 2.29e−07 −3.58e−05** 1.14e−05 −7.93e−06 −3.99e−05* −3.04e−05
(1.03e−05) (1.04e−05) (1.35e−05) (8.33e−06)  (1.71e−05) (1.10e−05) (1.22e−05) (2.23e−05) (2.83e−05)
Order  of games (IUG/NVC) 0.019 0.0793 0.112
(0.01) (0.06) (0.09)
Interaction (qr IUG/NVC) −0.122 −0.175
(0.11) (0.18)
Wald-test 50.97*** 27.47*** 27.16*** 15.61*** 32.55*** 13.86*** 13.45*** 32.45*** 14.51*** 7.07***
Observations 288 288 288 144 144 144 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.33 0.52 0.28 0.44 0.57 0.33 0.20
Signiﬁcance at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
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Table 4
Econometric analysis: OLS regressions for the responder’s decision (MAO).
Dependent variable: Share of the endowment demanded by responders
Between- UG UG NVC NVC
All  data All data All data Subject UG NVC First Second First Second
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Intercept 0.440*** 0.495*** 0.461*** 0.578*** 0.413*** 0.412*** 0.527*** 0.394*** 0.427*** 0.620***
(0.05)  (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.07) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16)
Responders’ effort (qr ) 0.013 −0.101 −0.096 −0.133 −0.072 0.269** −0.133 −0.071 0.298** −0.115
(0.09)  (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.23)
No-veto-cost (INVC) 0.103*** −0.003 −0.003 −0.173*
(0.01) (0.0494) (0.05) (0.09)
Interaction (qr INVC) 0.211** 0.211** 0.414**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.18)
Reward levels (Iap>ar ) −0.023 −0.0229 −0.001 −0.018 −0.022 −0.011 −0.025 0.008 −0.053
(0.03)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Reward  levels (Iar >ap ) −0.039 −0.039 −0.029 −0.034 −0.039 −0.085*** 0.017 0.031 −0.105
(0.03)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.08)
Endowment size (X(a, q)) 7.54e−06 7.19e−06 −7.12e−06 1.82e−05 −3.93e−06 1.60e−05 1.92e−05 −2.42e−05 2.39e−05
(1.66e−05) (1.59e−05) (1.27e−05) (1.48e−05)  (2.23e−05) (1.33e−05) (2.36e−05) (2.00e−05) (4.61e−05)
Order  of games (IUG/NVC) 0.065*** 0.097 0.264*
(0.02) (0.09) (0.14)
Interaction (qr IUG/NVC) −0.069 −0.384
(0.18) (0.27)
Wald-test 31.25*** 11.47*** 9.85*** 2.19** 2.84** 1.83* 6.34** 0.40 2.65** 1.44
Observations 288 288 288 144 144 144 72 72 72 72
R-squared 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.100 0.07 0.20 0.02 0.11 0.07
Signiﬁcance at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
154 I. Rodriguez-Lara / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 130 (2016) 144–165Fig. 3. Within-subject heterogeneity and behavior across games.
the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game. To see whether or not the performance in the questionnaire inﬂuences the MAO
in the ultimatum game, we look at the estimated coefﬁcient of qr . This is never signiﬁcant when we control for the reward
levels, the endowment size and order of the games (regressions 1–3) or when disaggregate the data by games (regressions
7 and 8), thus suggesting that the responders’ performance has no predicting power in their MAO  in the ultimatum game.
In line with our previous discussion, however, we  ﬁnd a signiﬁcant effect of the interaction term qr IUG/NVC), what indicates
that responders might take their contribution to the joint endowment into consideration in the no-veto-cost game (see
regressions 2–4). Our estimates conﬁrm that the effect of the responders’ performance in their MAO  is only important when
the no-veto-cost game is played ﬁrst (see regressions 9 and 10). As for the inﬂuence of the order in which the games are
played, we ﬁnd that the order in which the ultimatum game is played does not matter for responders’ behavior (regression
5), but it does the order in which no-veto-cost game is played (regression 6, p-value = 0.061). Finally, we  ﬁnd evidence for
the inﬂuence of the threat power in that responders demand a higher share of the joint endowment in the no-veto-cost
game, compared with the ultimatum game (see the estimated coefﬁcients of INVC and 
q
r INVC in regressions 1–4).
Result 2. Responders only demand a share of the joint endowment that corresponds to their effort in the questionnaire in the
no-veto-cost game, when this is played ﬁrst. Responders demand more in the no-veto-cost game than in the ultimatum game.
We provide further evidence on the order effects in the responders’ behavior in Fig. 3, which summarizes the different
behavioral patters that could be observed across games. In the horizontal (vertical) axis, we  plot deviations from equity
in the ultimatum (no-veto-cost) game, respectively. Thus, observations in the positive domain correspond to responders
that demand more than what they have contributed in these two games. As for the comparison of behavior across games,
the dotted line represents responders that demand the same in the ultimatum and the no-veto cost game (roughly 30% of
the data). Observations above this line (Regions A and B) correspond to responders who demand more in the ultimatum
game than in the no-veto-cost game (roughly 60% of the data), while observations below this line (Region C) corresponds to
responders who demand more in the no-veto-cost game (roughly 10% of the data).
When the ultimatum game is played ﬁrst (IUG/NVC), roughly one third of the data (30% of responders) is located in Region
A. These are responders that increase their demand in the no-veto-cost game and demand a share of the endowment that
largely exceeds their contribution. In sharp contrast, roughly half of the data (46% of responders) is located in Region B when
the no-veto-cost game is played ﬁrst (INVC/UG). These are responders that demand more in the no-veto-cost game than in the
ultimatum game without asking much more than what they have contributed.
When we test for differences in behavior across orders, the Fisher’s exact test ﬁnds signiﬁcant differences in behavior
depending on the order in which games are played (p-value = 0.025).23
23 We note that our results are robust if we  discard from responders in the dotted line that demand the same in both games or if we consider a different
classiﬁcation of the data. For example, we have allowed for responders in Region B to demand in the no-veto-cost game up to 0.10 more than what they
have  contributed. If we consider only responders who demand exactly their contribution or consider those who demand up to 0.05, the Fisher’s exact test
will  yield qualitative the same results (p-values < 0.05). The interested reader can consult Appendix B2 for several robustness checks, including the case in
which  Region A is halved to consider demands above and below the responders’ contribution in the ultimatum game.
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tig. 4. Rejection rates (left panel) and average ﬁnal payoffs (right panel) in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game. Error bars are standard errors of the
ean.
esult 3. When the no-veto-cost game is played ﬁrst, responders ask their contribution to the joint endowment, but then decrease
heir demand in the ultimatum game. When the no-veto-cost game is played after the ultimatum game, responders tend to increase
heir demand and ask more than what they have contributed.
We  support this ﬁnding by looking at the proportion of responders that demand more than what they have contributed
n the no-veto-cost game when this is played ﬁrst (45%) and second (57%).24 As for the possible effect of the responders’
ontribution in the responders’ behavior, we ﬁnd no correlation between the increase in the MAO  and the responders’
erformance in the questionnaire when the no-veto-cost game is played after the ultimatum game. When the ultimatum
ame is played after the no-veto-cost game, responders with better performance seem to decrease their MAO  proportionally
ore (see Appendix B1 for a detailed analysis).
In the next section, we investigate the extent to which differences in behavior result in differences in rejection rates and
fﬁciency gains in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game.
.3. Rejection rates, efﬁciency and procedural fairness in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game
Fig. 4 shows the observed frequency of rejections in the ultimatum game (dark grey) and the no-veto-cost game (light
rey); i.e. the frequency of times in which the proposer’s offer was below the responder’s MAO. The average ﬁnal payoffs
re also given in Fig. 4.
We  ﬁnd more rejections in the no-veto-cost game than in the ultimatum game (p-value < 0.001). We  also see that efﬁciency
as measured by the sum of ﬁnal payoffs) is higher in the ultimatum game than in the no-veto-cost game (p-value < 0.001).
hese results are robust when we consider the sequence in which the games are played.
esult 4. Rejections are more likely to occur in the no-veto-cost game than in the ultimatum game. In the no-veto-cost game,
fﬁciency losses are also higher than in the ultimatum game.
Our data suggest that settlements are more (less) likely when offers are above (below) the responders’ contribution or
bove (below) half of the endowment, both in the ultimatum and in the no-veto-cost game. By the same token, we  observe
ore settlements for MAOs below the responders’ contribution or below half of the endowment, compared with MAOs
bove the responders’ contribution or above half of the endowment (see Appendix B4 for further details). These ﬁndings
eing noteworthy, relevant to the current study is whether equity-concerned subjects get their contribution to the joint
ndowment. Our analysis is presented in the top panel of Fig. 5. This displays the observed frequency of rejection when
roposers decided to keep their contribution to the joint endowment (dark grey) so as to compare it with the observed
requency of rejections when responders decided to demand their contribution to the endowment (light grey), both in the
ltimatum game (left panel) and the no-veto-cost game (right panel). The bottom panel of Fig. 5 complements this analysis
y displaying the frequency of proposers and responders that obtained at least their contribution to the endowment in each
f the games.
We  ﬁnd that equity-concerned proposers who decide to keep their contribution to the joint endowment face less rejec-
ions in the ultimatum game than equity-concerned responder who decide to demand their contribution to the joint
ndowment (p-value < 0.016). Differences are not statistically signiﬁcant in the no-veto cost game (p-value = 0.20). Along
imilar lines, we observe that proposers are more likely than responders to obtain at least their contribution to the joint
24 This is in sharp contrast with the proportion of responders (roughly 32%) that demand more than what they have contributed in the ultimatum game.
n  addition, we  ﬁnd that those responders that decided to demand the entire endowment in the no-veto-cost game did it when the game was played after
he  ultimatum game. We  discuss these ﬁndings and provide an interpretation of the data in Section 5.
156 I. Rodriguez-Lara / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 130 (2016) 144–165Fig. 5. Procedural fairness in the ultimatum game (left panel) and the no-veto-cost game (right panel). Errors bar are standard errors of the mean.
endowment in the ultimatum game (p-value = 0.002). The situation is reversed in the no-veto-cost game (p-value < 0.001),
where rejections only affect the proposers’ payoffs.
Result 5. In the ultimatum game, rejections are more likely when responders demand their contribution to the joint endowment,
compared with the case in which proposers decide to keep their contribution to the joint endowment. This does not seem to
occur in the no-veto-cost game. Similarly, it is more likely for proposers (responders) to get at least their contribution to the joint
endowment in the ultimatum (no-veto-cost) game.
Our ﬁndings in this section point out to tradeoff between outcomes in bargaining games (i.e., rejection rates and efﬁciency)
and the issue of procedural fairness (i.e., the extent to which proposers and responder get their contribution to the joint
endowment).5. Concluding remarks
Since the seminal work of Güth et al. (1982), there is plenty of experimental evidence in showing that observed behavior
in the ultimatum game departs from the equilibrium prediction assuming self-regarding preferences. One robust result
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long these lines refers to the emergence of the equal division as the modal outcome (see Oosterbeek et al. (2004) or
üth and Kocher (2014) for a recent discussion of the results). Although this has been interpreted as evidence of fair
ehavior, one challenge for this literature is to study the extent to which subjects’ behavior is consistent with equity the-
ry. There is mounting evidence suggesting that subjects exhibit preferences over equity in games with production (see,
mong others, Konow, 1996; Frohlich et al., 2004 or Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010). It is also well documented that property
ights (i.e., entitlements) and outside options signiﬁcantly affect behavior (take, for example, Cherry et al. (2002), Garcia-
allego et al. (2008), Rode and Le Menestrel (2011) and Franco-Watkins et al. (2013) for the former and Ciampaglia et al.
2014), Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2013) and Anbarci and Feltovich (2013) for the later). As a result, it seems of ﬁrst order
mportant to investigate how equity theory interacts with the bargaining power when there is a joint endowment to be
istributed.
Using a within-subject design, we have studied behavior in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game with production,
hich differ in the cost to responders to reject the proposers’ offer. We  have shown that proposers compensate responders for
heir effort in the production of the joint endowment both in the ultimatum and in the no-veto cost game. Our results indicate
hat the proposers’ behavior is not inﬂuenced by the threat power of the responders. This is not the case for responders,
ho react to their bargaining power by increasing (decreasing) their demand in the no-veto-cost (ultimatum) game when
his is played after the ultimatum (no-veto-cost) game. Interestingly enough, our data suggest that the responders’ demands
re only consistent with equity theory in the no-veto-cost game, when this is played ﬁrst. When the no-veto-cost game is
receded by the ultimatum game, we observe that responders’ demand become (strikingly) aggressive with nearly 60% of
esponders demanding more than what they have contributed to the endowment.
Taken together, our ﬁndings contribute to the still scarce literature on the study of equity in bargaining games (Königstein,
000; Gantner et al., 2001; Fischbacher et al., 2012; Franco-Watkins et al., 2013; Luhan et al., 2014) by suggesting that
roposers and responders may  account for equity and the decision power in a very different manner. Our results for
roposers can be rationalized by assuming that proposers believe that responders will demand the same share of the
ndowment in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game. This would be a reasonable assumption given that respon-
ers cannot affect their payoffs in the later game. Proposers might also behave in the same manner in the ultimatum
nd the no-veto-cost game given that rejections are equally costly for them in both games; i.e., proposers may  ignore
hat rejections in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game have different payoff consequences for responders. Finally,
roposers might exhibit a strong preference for equity and be reluctant to offer responders more than what they con-
ider is a fair offer; i.e., proposers might have a (large) disutility when their offers to responders deviate from their
ontribution.
As for the behavior of responders, they do not demand their contribution to the endowment in the ultimatum game,
robably because there is a risk of rejection that will yield no payoffs for them. The fact that the responders’ demand is
igher in the no-veto-cost game could be then due to a desire for responders to demand their contribution to the joint
ndowment. Our ﬁndings that responders’ behavior is consistent with equity in the no-veto-cost game only when this is
layed ﬁrst, however, suggests that it is also important to account for the order in which the games were played. One
ossible reason for responders to demand more in the no-veto-cost game is to assume that responders suffer from quasi-
agical thinking (Shaﬁr and Tversky, 1992), which refers to the erroneous belief that, by acting in a particular manner,
ubjects can inﬂuence an outcome beyond their control; i.e., responders may  (erroneously) believe that by increasing their
emand in the no-veto-cost game, they can increase their payoff. Responders might also be spiteful and demand more in the
o-veto-cost game so as to increase the likelihood of rejection and urge proposers to get nothing as a result. Although there
s no feedback across games, responders playing the no-veto-cost game after the ultimatum game could also realize that
hey were given more power in the second game and may  have enjoyed using it. This interpretation, in turn, would suggest
hat increasing the bargaining power of responders during the bargaining process might lead them to exploit proposers by
ome sort of retaliation.
While our paper provides a set of important experimental ﬁndings into the relevance of equity considerations and the
argaining power in ultimatum games, we believe that further research is needed in this area. One fruitful direction would
e eliciting fairness judgments or including a post-experimental questionnaire so as to enrich our understanding of the
ehavior in games with joint endowment (Gächter and Riedl, 2005, 2006, Rode and Le Menestrel, 2011, Bediou et al., 2012;
ustichini and Villeval, 2014; Luhan et al., 2014; Bolton and Karagözogˆlu, 2015). By the same token, it would be worth
liciting risk preferences or the background characteristics of subjects to account for their predictive power. This might be
articularly helpful to better understand the responders’ behavior in the ultimatum game. The possibility of assessing the
mportance of the bargaining power in other settings where subjects can communicate and exchange proposals (e.g., make
romises and/or threats) seems to be a fertile research area as well (see Gächter and Riedl, 2005; Luhan et al., 2014; Bolton
nd Karagözogˆlu, 2015). Along these lines, the fact that we employed a within-subject design without feedback might have
ontributed to our ﬁnding that responders demand more than what they have contributed in the no-veto-cost game, when
his is played after the ultimatum game. Because proposers tend to offer responders their contribution to the endowment in
he ultimatum game, it would be a good idea to see how responders react in the no-veto-cost game when they observe such
ehavior from proposers. Last, but not least, we think that the issue of procedural fairness deserves more attention. A third
arty that needs to set up the bargaining rules may  be interested in giving all subjects the same possibilities to demand their
ontribution to the endowment during the bargaining process. While we  do not address this issue directly, we have shown
hat the ﬁrst-mover advantage in the ultimatum game and the asymmetry of power in the no-veto-cost game might help
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subjects to obtain their contribution to the joint endowment. This leaves the door open for exploring other settings (e.g., the
Nash bargaining game) to test whether or not subjects will be awarded the same opportunities to obtain their contribution
to the joint endowment.
Appendix A: Instructions25
Welcome to the experiment!
This is an experiment to study decision making, so we are not interested in your particular choices but rather in the
individuals’ average behavior. Thus, all through the experiment you will be treated anonymously. Neither the experimenters
nor the people in this room will ever know your particular choices. Please do not think that we expect a particular behavior
from you. However, keep in mind that your behavior might affect the amount of money you can win.
Next, you will ﬁnd instructions on the computer screen explaining how the experiment unfolds. The instructions are
the same for all subjects in the laboratory and will be read aloud by experimenters. Please follow them carefully, as it is
important that you understand the experiment before starting.
Talking is forbidden during the experiment. If you have any questions, raise your hand and remain silent. You will be
attended to by the experimenters as soon as possible.
First phase
The experiment has three phases. In the ﬁrst phase, you are able to accumulate money by solving a questionnaire.
The quiz that you will face is the same for all subjects in the room and contains 20 multiple-choice questions with 5
possible answers (only one of them is correct). You have 35 min  to solve the quiz. Each of your correct answers will be
rewarded at a reward rate that will be the same for each correct answer but may  vary across individuals. No questions
will be rewarded higher than others and the reward of each correct answer will be randomly announced once you ﬁn-
ish the questionnaire. This reward per correct answer lies between 100 and 200 pesetas and does not depend on your
performance.
Next, you will now receive the questionnaire on a piece of paper. To answer the questions, you must use the computer
screen. Please do not write on the questionnaire, and make sure that you have selected your answers correctly on the com-
puter screen before continuing, as the computer will automatically check your answers at the end of this phase. Calculators
cannot be used during the experiment. You will be provided an additional piece of paper to make computations if needed.
Remember that during the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with each other: you can only communicate
with the experimenters.
Second phase
In this second phase, you will be randomly matched with a subject in this room and your total earnings will be announced.
Remember that the reward of each correct answer is randomly determined so it does not depend on your performance in
the quiz.
In this phase you will also be assigned a type, that is, you will either be player A or player B. This type is randomly
determined as well. Your type will be important for the next phase.
Please see your computer screen for a summary of your total earnings and detailed information about the number of
correct questions and the reward level of each member of the pair.
Third phase
In this ﬁnal phase, you will be asked about how to distribute the total earnings in two different scenarios. In both of them,
player A will act as the proposer. He/she will make an offer about how to distribute the total earnings, whereas player B has
to decide what is the minimum amount that he/she will be willing to accept. Both player A and player B will make their
decisions simultaneously (i.e., without knowing what the other member of the pair has done). At the end of the experiment,
we will select one of the scenarios at random and you will be paid depending on the choices that you made, as we detail
below.
Scenario 1. The subject that has been randomly selected as player A will make a proposal to player B, who will choose
his/her minimum acceptable offer. If this scenario is selected to pay you at the end of the experiment, the payoffs will be as
follows:• If the amount that player A offers to player B exceeds (or is equal to) the minimum acceptable offer of player B, then the
total earnings will be divided according the decision of player A.
• If the amount that player A offers to player B is below the minimum acceptable offer, then both players will get nothing.
25 This section presents the instructions (originally in Spanish) for the case in which the ultimatum game was  played ﬁrst. The instruction for the case in
which the no-veto-cost game was played ﬁrst the same, but changing the order of the Scenarios in the third phase.
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Next, you will see some examples that show how payoffs are computed. Then, you will be asked to make your decision
for the total earnings that you have accumulated.
Remember that your choices will be treated anonymously. Neither during the experiment nor after the experiment will
you know the identity of the person you are matched with.
We generated some examples in which the total earnings to be distributed were 100. The examples were the same for each
subjects in the sessions: the computer randomly decided the offer in [0,100] and the minimum acceptable offer in [0,100]. For each
example, the computer showed subjects how the ﬁnal payoffs would be determined.
Only after making their choices for Scenario 1, subjects could see the instructions of Scenario 2. This was played receiv-
ing no feedback whatsoever about the decisions in Scenario 1. Both the matching and the subjects’ role is kept constant,
as we detail in Section 2. Before making their choices in Scenario 2, subjects were also presented some examples to
make sure that they knew how payoffs were determined. Once again, the examples were the same for all subjects in the
session.
Scenario 2. The subject that has been randomly selected as player A will make a proposal to player B, who  will choose
his/her minimum acceptable offer. If this scenario is selected to pay you at the end of the experiment, the payoffs will be as
follows:
• If the amount that player A offers to player B exceeds (or is equal to) the minimum acceptable offer of player B, then the
total earnings will be divided according the decision of player A.
• If the amount that player A offers to player B is below the minimum acceptable offer, then player A will get nothing. Player
B will get the amount that player A has decided to offer him/her in this scenario.
Next, you will see some example that shows how payoffs are computed. Then, you will be asked to make your decision
for the total earnings that you have accumulated.
Remember that your choices will be treated anonymously. Neither during the experiment nor after the experiment will
you know the identity of the person you are matched with.
Appendix B
Appendix B1: Within-subject behavior
Fig. 6 displays the distribution of the difference of choices between the two  games within-subjects; i.e., we represent
the difference between what each proposer (responder) offers (demands) in the no-veto-cost game and what each proposer
(responder) offers (demands) in the ultimatum game. Table 5 summaries the within-subject behavior, including information
about the share of proposers and responders that increase and decrease their offers and MAO, respectively. In line with our
Fig. 6. Differences in choices in the two games (within-subject).
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Table  5
Differences in behavior (within-subject).
Within-subject difference
Proposer Responder
Mean 0.01 0.10
Standard deviation 0.12 0.16
Maximum 0.52 0.54
Minimum −0.57 −0.22
Share  offering/demanding more in the no-veto-cost game 0.41 0.60
Share offering/demanding the same in both games 0.44 0.32
Share offering/demanding more in the ultimatum game 0.15 0.08
Ultimatum game is played ﬁrst
Share offering/demanding more in the no-veto-cost game 0.46 0.54
Share offering/demanding the same in both games 0.42 0.39
Share offering/demanding more in the ultimatum game 0.12 0.07
No-veto-cost game is played ﬁrst
Share offering/demanding more in the no-veto-cost game 0.36 0.65
Share offering/demanding the same in both games 0.46 0.25
Share offering/demanding more in the ultimatum game 0.20 0.10
Notes: There are 288 subjects in our data: 144 proposers and 144 responders.
description of the data, we observe that responders are more likely to increase their MAO  than proposers are likely to increase
their offer. This is a robust ﬁnding when we look at the order in which the games are played.
Fig. 7 displays the difference in behavior in the two  games (within-subject) as a function of the responders’ contribution.
The behavior of the proposer (responder) is presented in the left (right) panel, respectively. We  present the pooled data
in the top panel, where we report differences in behavior in the no-veto-cost game and the ultimatum game. The data,
disaggregated by the order in which the games are played, is presented in the middle and bottom panel (in each case,
differences in behavior are obtained by subtracting the offer or the demand in the second game and the offer or the demand
in the ﬁrst one). The Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcient between the differences in the MAOs and the responder’s
performance in the questionnaire is given in the ﬁgures.
As already suggested in the main text, we observe that proposers’ behavior is quite stable in the two games, and
no effect of the responders’ contribution is identiﬁed in the proposers’ decision to increase or decrease the offer (p-
values > 0.57). As for responders, we observe that majority of the data are above (below) the horizontal line when the
ultimatum (no-veto-cost) game is played ﬁrst. This highlights the effect of the threat power in the responders’ behav-
ior in that responders demand more in the no-veto-cost game; i.e., responders increase (decrease) their MAO  in the
no-veto-cost (ultimatum) game when this is played after the ultimatum (no-veto-cost) game. The reported correlation
coefﬁcients suggest a negative relationship between differences in the MAO  and performance in the questionnaire (p-
value = 0.028) when the no-veto-cost game is played ﬁrst. Thus, responders with better performance tend to decrease their
MAO  more. When the ultimatum game is played ﬁrst, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcient suggests that the changes
in the MAO  are independent of the responders’ performance in the questionnaire (p-value = 0.60). This later result was,
to some extend, unexpected, as it seems to suggest that responders increase their MAO  in the no-veto-cost game but do
not increase it to behave according to equity theory. We  provide further evidence for this behavior in the next section
(Appendix B2)
Appendix B2: Responders’ behavior and order effects
We  have identiﬁed effects of order in responders’ behavior, both in our econometric analysis of Table 4 and the graphical
analysis of Fig. 3. Next, we provide some further evidence into the responders’ behavior, as a robustness check. First, Fig. 8
presents our data by displaying the responder’s deviations from equity in each of the game, depending on the whether
the ultimatum game (left panel) or the no-veto-cost game (right panel) is played ﬁrst. Observations lying on the vertical
(horizontal) line should be interpreted as responders demanding their contribution to the joint endowment in the ultimatum
(no-veto-cost) game. Observations on the 45 degree line correspond to responders that demand the same in both games.
In line with previous discussion, we observe that responders ask for more in the no-veto-cost game in that majority of
observations are above the 45 degree line.
If responders demanded more in the no-veto-cost game to ask for their contribution to the joint endowment, we  should
observe observations clustering around the horizontal line at 0. This does not seem to be the case when the no-veto-cost
game is preceded by the ultimatum-game (left panel), but when it is the ﬁrst game to be played (right panel). Overall, this
conﬁrms our ﬁndings that responders demand more in the no-veto-cost game but demand their contribution only when
the game is played ﬁrst (see the econometric analysis in Table 4 in the main text).
In Fig. 3 we have grouped the data by considering three different regions, depending on whether responders demand
more in the no-veto-cost game and whether or not their demand in the no-veto-cost game exceeds their contribution to
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Fig. 7. A bubble plot for (within-subject) differences in choices in the no-veto-cost game and the ultimatum game for each possible order of games.
162 I. Rodriguez-Lara / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 130 (2016) 144–165Fig. 8. Responder’s deviations from equity in the ultimatum game (horizontal axis) and the no-veto-cost game (vertical axis), for each possible order of
games.
the joint endowment. Using our classiﬁcation, the Fisher’s exact test suggests that the order in which games are played play
a role on the responders’ behavior (p-value = 0.025). We  might eliminate responders that demand the same in both games
from the analysis, and the Fisher’s exact test will yield qualitative the same results (p-value = 0.040). We can also provide a
different classiﬁcation of the data, such as the one presented in Fig. 9.
When the ultimatum game is played ﬁrst, majority of the data (43% of responders) is located in Region A. This corresponds
to responders that increase their demand in the no-veto-cost game and ask more than what they have contributed. In
sharp contrast, majority of the data (36% of responders) is located in Region B when the no-veto-cost game is played
ﬁrst. These are responders that demand more in the no-veto-cost game than in the ultimatum game without asking much
more than what they have contributed. When we test for differences in behavior across orders, the Fisher’s exact test ﬁnds
signiﬁcant differences (p-value = 0.028). Again, these results are robust to other speciﬁcations. For example, we have allowed
for responders in Region B to demand up to 0.03 more than what they have contributed. If we consider only responders
who demand up to 0.10 or responders who demand exactly their contribution (i.e., when we  consider the horizontal line
at 0 to plot Region B), the Fisher’s exact test would yield similar results (p-values < 0.038). Similarly, we  have considered
two different regions for responders that demand the same in both games, namely Regions A (where the MAO  is below
Fig. 9. Within-subject heterogeneity and behavior across games.
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the responders’ contribution) and the dotted line included as a part of Region A (where the MAO  is above the responders’
contribution). If we do not include the dotted line in Region A but consider this to be a different category, the results are
qualitative the same (p-value = 0.055).
Appendix B3: Equity and the libertarian ideal
While subjects seem to employ the accountability principle, there is also evidence that some subjects are libertarian (e.g.,
Cappelen et al., 2007, 2010; Bediou et al., 2012; Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido, 2012; Ubeda, 2014). This appendix
replicates part of our analysis in Section 4.2 to study the importance of equity theory when we focus on the libertarian ideal.
This fairness view states that subjects should be rewarded for their monetary contribution to the joint endowment, despite
that there exist external factors beyond their control (i.e., reward levels).
Fig. 10 displays the proposer and the responder’s behavior in the ultimatum game (top panel) and the no-veto-cost game
(bottom panel) as a function of the responder’s relative monetary contribution, xr = xr(qr, ar)/X(a, q). The Spearman’s rank
correlation coefﬁcient between both variables is given in Table 6. This includes information disaggregated by the order in
which the games are played.
In line with our ﬁndings, the proposer’s behavior seems to be consistent with the idea of equity in that the correlation
between the offer and the responder’s contribution is positive and signiﬁcant in both games (p-values < 0.001). The order
of the games does not seem to affect the proposers’ decision to offer responders an amount that reﬂects their contribution
to the joint endowment. As for the responders’ MAO, the correlation between the responders’ MAO  and their monetary
contribution is not signiﬁcant in the ultimatum game or the no-veto-cost game when we consider the pooled data. There is,
however, a signiﬁcant correlation between the responders’ MAO  and their contribution to the endowment in the no-veto
cost game when this is played ﬁrst (p-value = 0.010).
Fig. 10. A bubble plot of choices in the ultimatum game (top panel) and the no-veto-cost game (bottom panel).
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Table  6
Spearman’s rank correlation coefﬁcient between subject’s behavior (Offer/MAO) and the responder’s contribution to the endowment, disaggregated by the
order  in which the games are played.
Ultimatum game No-veto-cost game
Proposer Responder Proposer Responder
Correlation coefﬁcient (All data) 0.68*** −0.09 0.51*** 0.09
The  game is played ﬁrst 0.67*** −0.19† 0.47*** 0.30**
The  game is played second 0.70*** −0.05 0.59*** −0.12
Note: There are 288 subjects in our data: 144 proposers and 144 responders. Half of the data corresponds to the ultimatum (no-veto-cost) game being
played  ﬁrst. Signiﬁcance at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level. † p-value equals 0.102.
Table 7
Rejection rates in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game for offers and MAO  above and below half of the endowment, and offer and MAO  above and
below  the recipients’ contribution.
Ultimatum game No-veto-cost game
Proposer Responder Proposer Responder
Offer/demand more than half 0.14 0.76 0.32 0.77
Offer/demand less than half 0.55 0.23 0.74 0.23
2-test 18.90*** 30.80*** 21.70*** 35.88***
Offer/demand more than contribution 0.41 0.79 0.45 0.83
Offer/demand less than contribution 0.44 0.19 0.66 0.22
2-test 0.08 40.35*** 5.11** 47.09***Note: There are a total of 288 observations in each of the games: 144 proposers and 144 responders.
Signiﬁcance at the *10%, **5%, ***1% level.
Appendix B4: Rejection rates
In Table 7 we report the observed frequency of rejections for offers and MAO  that are above and below half of the
endowment (top panel) and offers and MAOs that are above and below the recipients’ contribution to the joint endowment
(bottom panel).
We  observe that offers (MAO) are more likely to be rejected when they are below (above) half of the endowment, both
in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game. Similarly, offers (MAO) are more likely to be rejected when they are below
(above) the recipient’s contribution to the joint endowment, both in the ultimatum and the no-veto-cost game. All pairwise
comparisons are signiﬁcant using a 2-test, except in the ultimatum game, when we  compare proposers’ offers above and
below the recipients’ contribution.
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